Some Tax Aspects of Leaseholds by Schiller, Melvin D. & Holtzman, Sylvan N.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 11 
Number 2 Miami Law Quarterly Article 12 
1-1-1957 
Some Tax Aspects of Leaseholds 
Melvin D. Schiller 
Sylvan N. Holtzman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Melvin D. Schiller and Sylvan N. Holtzman, Some Tax Aspects of Leaseholds, 11 U. Miami L. Rev. 273 
(1957) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol11/iss2/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
SOME TAX ASPECTS OF LEASEHOLDS
MELVIN D. SCNILLER* SYLVAN N. HOLTZMAN
The drafting of a lease should never be undertaken without an objective
appraisal of the possible tax consequences and their impact on either the
lessor or the lessee, depending upon whom the attorney is representing.
Excursions into the realn of theoretical and academic dominions are
sometimes stimulating and provocative, but to satisfy the desire of the
practitioner, who is usually too "busy" to enjoy such luxurious cruises, we
have attempted to steer a course through this area with the hope that it
will provide the answers to many tax questions so often an incident to the
landlord-tenant relationship.
Some of the questions and problems which arise and which should be
anticipated by the attorney drafting a lease can be categorized as follows:
A. What Constitutes Rent?-Lease-Purchase Agreements.
B. Occupancy-Buy, Lease, or Sale and Lease-back.
C. Purchase of Fee by Lessee.
D. Close Relationship Between Lessor and Lessee.
E. Advance Payments by Lessee.
F. Depreciation, Amortization, and Related Problems of Lessee.
G. Depreciation, Amortization, and Related Problems of Lessor.
H. Bonus to Cancel Lease.
What Constitutes Rent?
Generally, rent may be in the guise of expenditures seemingly made
for purposes other than for the use and occupancy of the property. The
lessor and the lessee may agree as to what expenditures will constitute
rent under a particular lease. For example, interest, taxes,2 and certain
maintenance and other expenditures3 may under certain conditions consti-
tute rent payments insofar as the lessee's obligation under the lease is
concerned. In most instances, no problem arises where the intentions of
*B.S.C., LL.B., LL.M. (graduate University of Miami, School of Law Tax Training
Program), C.P.A.; Lecturer in Law, University of Miami School of Law; Member of
the Florida Bar.
**Senior student, University of Miami School of Law; Executive Editor, Miami Law
Quarterly.
1. Denholm & McKay, 39 B.T.A. 767 (1939).
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, See. 39.23 (a)-10 (1953). An exception is made in
the case of certain leases entered into before January 1, 1954, and renewals of such
leases if the option to renew is contained in the lease on December 31, 1953. INT. REV.
CovE of 1954, § 110.
3. But see Frank & Seder Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1930).
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the parties are fully expressed in the lease. 4 Nevertheless, where the cx-
penditure by the lessee is reasonable, and is an incident to the occupancy
by the lessee, if not an allowable deduction for rent it will generally be
allowable as an ordinary and necessary business expense.5 But, in at least
one situation,6 where more than $22,000 was paid by the lessee for taxes
on leased property, it was held not deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense since the lessee could show no obligation under his lease
to pay such taxes.
It is axiomatic that where a deduction is allowed the lessee for rent
payment, the lessor's income should ultimately be increased by an identical
amount. Consequently, the Commissioner may, for purposes of increas-
ing the income of the lessor, decide that cxpenditures made by the lessee
should be construed as rent. However, in M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States,7
the Supreme Court held that improvements by the lessee will not be deenied
rent unless such inteution is plainly disclosed. The Court stated, in part:
Rent is a fixed sum to be paid at stated times for use of prop-
erty . . . it does not include payments, uncertain both as to amount
and time, made for the cost of improvements. .... 
Where payments by the lessee have dual potentialities of classifica-
tion, namely, whether such payments will constitute rent or whether they
are to be applied to the purchase price of the property," has always been a
difficult characterization problem for income tax purposes. Generally, if
such payments exceed the allowable depreciation on the property, it is less
of a distortion of income to regard them as payments toward the purchase
price and allow the deduction for depreciation on the property than to
consider the payments as rent and utilized as an offset against the income
for the year.' Where, in the opinion of the Commissioner, the taxpayer
acquires an equity interest in the property, monthly payments are not de-
ductible as rent."
Occupancy - Buy, Lease, or Sale and Lease-Back
After disposing of the preliminary problems incident to the acquisition
of property and it is decided that leasing is more favorable tax-wise than an
outright purchase, the problems of buyer and seller become integrated with
the problems of lessor-lessee (landlord-tenant). This is best illustrated
in the sale and lease-back situations, where a taxpayer who owns real prop-
4, See N1. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
5. Suora note 3.
6. Robinson v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1931).
7. 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
8. Id. at 277.
9. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d (9th Cir. 1932).
10. Chicago Stoker Corp., 14"I.C. 441 (1950); cf. Benton v. Commissioner, 197
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952) (where the intention of the parties controlled).
11. Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Goldfields of America, Ltd., 44 B.T.A. 200
(1941); But see Calcasieu Paper Co., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1953).
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erty but who has only a limited amount of current funds would like to use
these funds and additional monies resulting from the sale of real prop-
erty as working capital. By so doing, he still has the use of the necessary
or desirable real property or equipment in addition to strengthening his
current position. In selling his real property a provision should be made
for a lease-back from the purchaser for a term of years. After the transac-
tion is closed, the rental paid would be deductible as an operating expense,
and, if the real property bad been sold at a gain, the rental expense would
reduce the taxable income. If the real property had been sold at a loss, the
taxpayer would have a loss in addition to the operating expense deduction.
A sale of property used in the business followed by a lease-back from
the new owner can sometimes convert a capital loss into an ordinary loss.' 2
Assuming that most of the problems have been analyzed incident to
the advantages and disadvantages of a sale and lease-back, in addition to
the questions of depreciation deduction as compared with rental expense,
there are still certain important problems which should not be overlooked.
First, is it a bona fide business transaction?' 5 Further, what is the duration
of the lease? To avoid the transaction being classified as a tax-free exchange,
thus disallowing a loss deduction on sale of the property, the lease should
be less than 30 years.' 4 Also, to prevent disallowance of the loss deduc-
tion, options of renewal should be avoided;'5 likewise, options to repur-
chase should be avoided."' However, where the sale would result in a gain,
it is conceivable that it would be desirable to have such a transaction
classified as a tax-free exchange.' 7
If a sale is intended, there should be a close relationship between the
12. For example, a corporation has suffered a capital loss in the current year
with a carry-over to the current year. There is either no tax benefit from the carry-over
or at best an offset against a 25% tax. The corporation now sells business property to
an investor and realizes a gain to match the capital loss. It leases back the property
and pays rent which will reduce ordinary income taxable at 52%. It has obtained the
following advantages:
1. In place of a loss which is non-deductible or which reduces a 25% tax, it
has a deduction which will reduce a 52% tax.
2. It has realized working capital from the sale. While the working capital will
be paid back over the years as rent, it may fill an immediate and pressing need.
Mahon, The Tax Clinic, 101(2) I'E JOURNAL or AccowN'ANcY 81, (Feb. 1956).
13. Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950). The court, in holding that
the sale was a bona fide business transaction, looked to the following factors:
1. No evidence of any relationship between buyer and seller;
2. Lease was for a term of less than 30 years, and therefore was not the equiv-
alent of a fee;
3. Although seller's cash position was benefited, it made no difference. A tax-
payer may give consideration to the tax consequences of transactions. United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Ser. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1949);
4. Seller proved that the rental agreed upon was a fair rental of the property.
14. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, 39.112 (b) (1)-I (1953).
15. Note 13 supra.
16. May Dep't. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15
T.C. 41 (1950).
17. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1031.
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sale price and the fair market value. 8 And remember, that wherever a
close relationship exists between the buyer and the seller, such transactions
will always receive close scrutiny, and underlying such instances there should
b1 a sound business purpose which will withstand the tests for substance
and form.' 9
Purchase of the Fee by the Lessee
Where the lessee purchases the fee on which lie has erected a build-
ing to avoid an onerous lease, and the purchase price is in excess of the
fair narket value of the unimproved land, a significant problem is presented
to the practitioner when he must determine how the excess is to be treated.
Prior to 1956, the courts followed the theory laid down in Cleveland-Allerton
Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner20 case, wherein lessee paid $241,250 in excess
of the unimproved value of the land as purchase price for the fee. The
Tax Court denied the lessee any deduction, treating the lessee as a third
party purchaser who would be required to depreciate the purchase price
over the remaining life of the asset. The Circuit Court, however, in re-
versing the Tax Court, characterized the transaction as the purchasc of a
nondepreciable asset plus the purchase of a release from a burdensome ob-
ligation. Thus, the lessee was allowed a deduction of $241,250 in the year
of purchase. The Circuit Court relied on cases holding that a lessee's
cost in abandoning a lease are deductible as a business expense.2' How-
ever, they overlooked the fact that the lessee's economic position was not
substantially changed; that he continued to occupy and use the land, and
at the same time allowed to accumulate into one large deduction items
which would have been future costs under the terms of the now extinct
lease.
The Cleveland case was followed six years later in Troc, Inc. v. United
States,22 under similar facts, where the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the
difference between the fair market value of the land and the agreed option
price as an ordinary and necessary business expense in the year in which the
option to purchase was exercised.
It was not until 1956 that the Supreme Court clarified the problem,
as decided in Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner.28 In this case,
taxpayer had a 21 year lease on land with renewal options. The lease
required the taxpayer to erect a building and transfer it to the landlord at
18. May Dcp't. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951).
19. Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1239 may
have the effect of deterring some sale and lease back transactions. This provision results
in taxation as ordinary income, rather than capital gain, of any gain involved in a trans-
fer of depreciable property between spouses or between an individual and a controlled
corporation.
20. 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948).
21. Henry C. Rowe, 19 B.T.A. 906 (1930); A. FT. Fell, 7 B.T.A. 263 (1927).
22. 126 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
23. 350 U.S. 456 (1956).
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the expiration of the tenancy. The taxpayer erected tile building and
fully depreciated the cost over the 21 year term. The taxpayer renewed
the lease for an additional 21 years and then purchased the fee in both
the land and the building. The difference of $1,440,000 represented the
excess value of the purchase price over the value of the unimproved land.
The petitioner's main argument was that the $1,440,000 should be
deductible as an ordinary business expense as the price of cancellation of
an onerous lease. Alternatively, it suggested amortization of this amount
over the unexpired term of the new lease. The Supreme Court denied both
of the petitioner's contentions, injecting a new interpretation not previously
recognized by either the 6th Circuit which decided the Cleveland case or
the 2d Circuit which had decided the instant case. The Court said that the
lessee had acquired rights in both the land and building which should
be identical with the rights of an original purchaser, including the right
to depreciate the cost of the wasting asset, namely the building. Thus, the
cost of the building, allocated from the purchase price, was to be depre-
ciated over the useful remaining life of the building. The Court went fur-
them and ruled that this would be the result regardless of whether the
purchase was made a short time before the expiration of the original lease
or shortly after the lease was renewed.
In view of the foregoing decision, where the purchase price exceeds
the fair market value of the land, such excess can only be depreciated by
the lessee over the useful remaining life of the building rather than the
elections heretofore made, namely:
1) deduction as an ordinary or necessary business expense;2'
2) deduction over the unexpired portion of the old lease.
2
Close Relationship Between Lessor and Lessee
Where the problem of close relationship is confronted, reasonableness
usually is the criterion to determine whether the claimed deduction will
be allowed. However, the question of reasonableness, being one approached
with objectivity, sometimes becomes enmeshed with subjective interpreta-
tions by the court. Consequently, special care must be taken to preclude
deductions ordinarily allowable in an arm's length transaction from be-
ing disallowed. The burden of proof, being on the taxpayer, must be met
with sufficient quantum to satisfy the most rigid requirements of the Code.
being mindful that deductions are a matter of "legislative grace. ' 28
Mere formalities are not sufficient. The transaction must have sub-
stance and generally must be associated with a business purpose."
Where the lessee is the sole stockholder in the lessor corporation, there
24. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162 (a).
25. Willcutts v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 103 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1939).
26. Kamen Soap Products, PH-TcM 1956-157.
27. Riverpoint Lace Works, Inc., 54143 PH Memo TC (1954).
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is a possibility that no deduction will be allowed, either as a leasehold amor-
tization or depreciation charge,28 and the "rent deduction" closely scruti-
nized for reasonableness. However, in one instance, where the petitioner
company was an operating entity actively engaged in a legitimate business,
the close relationship of the corporate officers of the participating corpora-
tions did not prevent a depreciation of $565,221.90 over a ten year period,29
because the facts disclosed a reasonable relationship, one that would be
occasioned in an arm's length transaction between lessor corporation and
lessee corporation. The underlying theory which permeates the court's
thinking in instances such as the foregoing appears to be predicated upon
the adequacy of the rental payment as being necessary for continued use
and occupancy of the premises. Close relationship per se is not the sole
criterion in determining deductibility, however, where it does exist it places
an additional burden upon the taxpayer to justify such payments. Reason-
ableness itself appears to be the keynote. Where the required conditions
have been met, the deductions will be allowed."0
Advance Payments by Lessee
In considering the subject matter of "advance" payments, a charac-
terization of the nature of the payment is necessary. For example, is the
payment a loan,8 ' or in fact rent for a later period;2 is it a security deposit
conditioned upon satisfactory performance by the lessee of certain condi-
tions in the lease;33 is it in the nature of a bonus to guarantee acquisition
of the premnises;34 or is it a payment for some obligation of the lessor which
is assumed by the lessee.35 It is an elementary proposition, but one worthy
28. Wade Motors Co., 26 T.C. 28 (1956).
29. Fort Wharf Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 202 (1954).
30. Ned Co., 22 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1954), where the court apatly stated:
. . . [W]hile the actions of a family corporation or family group should be
carefully scrutinized, it is entirely conceivable that the relations each with the
other . . . may be such that they will deal with each other strictly at arm's
length. In fact, it sometimes happens that their very nearness in blood leads
them to be more independent in action than strangers in blood ...
In Henry C. Bender, 47108 PH Memo T.C. (1947), the court reversed the Com-
missioner's holding that partnership rental paid to a corporation owned by the part-
ners and their wives was excessive:
. . . (The rent) was such an amount as a landlord dealing at arm's length with
a tenant, neither of them being under compulsion, might reasonably require the
tenant to pay for the privilege of occupying the premises involved.
See Walter 1-. Sutliff, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942); Cf. Hort v. Helvering, 313 U.S.
28 (1941).
31. Atlantic Refrigerating Co., 42382 PH Memo B.T.A. (19421.
32. Hirseh In-Provement Co., 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1944); Schultz, 44 B.T.A.
146 (1941); Mead Coal Co., 31 B.T.A. 190 (1934).
33. Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942);
Warren Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940); Estate of Geo.
E. Barker, 13 B.T.A. 562 (1928).
34. Baton Coal Co., 51 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir. 1931); Butler, 19 B.T.A. 718 (1930);
O'Day Investment Co., 13 B.T.A. 1230 (1928).
35. Allard & Bro., Inc. v. United States, 28"F.2d 792 (D.C. Mass. 1928); W. M.
Scott, 27 B.T.A. 951 (1933); Saks & Co., 20 B.T.A. 1151 (1930).
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of repeating, namely, that to the lessor these payments constitute income
and to the lessee they constitute expense. Likewise, where unconditional
payments (unrestricted in their use) are made to the landlord, such pay-
ments are taxable income when received, but are deductible expenses over
the period of the lease by the lessee 6 regardless of what method of ac-
counting is employed by either landlord or tenant.
37
Where a bona fide security deposit is paid to the lessor, no income
results because the security will be returned to the lessee upon faithful per-
formance of the conditions in the lease. In a true security deposit trans-
action, consequently, no income or expense would be reported. However,
most problems arise because of the failure of the lease to clearly reflect
the real nature of the advance payment, so that its true character is shrouded
in ambiguity. Labeling a payment as a security deposit is not sufficient.
Such funds should not be used by the lessor for operating purposes, but
should, in fact, be physically identified as a restricted fund. The payment
of interest is only a superficial consideration. 8
Usually the lessor is confronted with an anamolous situation where the
"advance payment" is considered income in the year in which received,
but the expenses incident to the acquisition of such lease must be spread
over the term of the lease. Suppose, for example, the lessor negotiated a
99 year lease with the last 10 years' rent ($20,000) being paid in advance,
with the broker's commission amounting to $10,000 being paid by the
lessor.3 9 The broker's commission would necessarily be deducted over the
term of 99 year lease (1/99 per year) although the rent received for the
10 years would be included in income in the current year. Further, assum-
ing that the commission represented 5% of the value of the lease, the
lessor would then be required to include approximately $20,000 in income
and allowed only approximately $100 as a deduction for amortization of
leasehold expenses!
The court's comment in the foregoing case decided in 1936, was that
although the result was unfair, they were helpless and that legislative relief
was needed.40 However, even after 20 years, including several major revisions
of the Code, the "relief" as originally envisioned by the court still remains
forthcoming from the legislature.
Depreciation, Amortization and Related Problems of Lessee
It is a generally recognized accounting principle that an allowance for
exhaustion of the leasehold should be spread equally over the term of the
36. United States v. Boston & Prov. R.R., 37 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1930).
37. I.T. 2263, CuM. BULL. V-i, 66 (1939).
38. E.g., Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); Cf. Astor Holding
Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 19431.
39. See Renwick v. United States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936).
40. Ibid.
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lease unless the estimated useful life of the capital expenditure is a shorter
period, in which event the shorter period becomes the term over which this
deduction is allowed.4 '
Where the nature of the payment by the lessee becomes difficult to
characterize, that is, as to whether it is rent, loan,42 or purchase, the prac-
titioner should be aware that the Commissioner will naturally place the
burden of proof on the taxpayer, particularly when a rent deduction would
result in a greater tax advantage than a depreciation deduction.
A lessee will be permitted the deduction for rent expense without in-
curring a simultaneous expenditure where the accrual method of account-
ing is employed and the accrued liability reflects the obligation to the
landlord. A seemingly incongruous situation arises where the landlord is
on the cash basis because no income is reported until the rental payments
are received from the lessee.
Expenditures made in the course of business for the acquisition of
a lease covering a period of more than one year are not deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses regardless of whether the taxpayer is
on the cash or the accrual basis. Such expenditures must be amortized over
the term of the lease.43
Many factors must be considered in determining whether expenditures
by the lessee are to be capitalized or expensed in the year in which such
expenditures are made.
Leasehold improvements made by the lessee are generally amortized
over the term of the lease, or depreciated over the life of the improvement,
whichever is shorter.4" The element of obsolescence is a factor which should
not be overlooked.4
Where no written lease exists, and the relationship is one of tenancy
at will, the cost of improvcments generally cannot be deducted as an ex-
pense in the year in which made, but must be depreciated over the useful
life of the property."' To illustrate, a corporation erected a building on
land which it rented on a month to month basis from its principal stock-
holders. It was reasonable to assume that the tenancy would continue in-
definitely inasmuch as the principal stockholders profited by having such
a relationship continue. Therefore, the life of the building was the only
basis upon which a reasonable depreciation could be computed.4  Unfor-
tunately, however, this reasonable attitude of the Commissioner was aban-
41. Duffy v. Central R.R. of N.J., 268 U.S. 55 (1925); T.D. 3704, IV-1 CUM.
BULL, 143 (1925).
42. Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
43. See note 57 infra.
44. Alamo Broadcasting Co., 15 T.C. 534 (1950).
45. Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir, 1944).
46. Thatcher Medicine Co., 3 B.T.A. 154 (1925).
47. Ibid.
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doned in at least one instance 4 where substantial capital improvements
were made in excess of $90,000 during the last three years of a 10 year
lease. The Commissioner claimed that the entire amount should have been
fully deducted by the end of the original lease although the lease was re-
newed and extended. The Tax Court, however, realistically and in accord-
ance with the weight of authority, felt that the depreciation should be
based upon the life of the improvements.
In some instances where multiple interdependent leases are involved,49
it is recommended that the leases expire at the same time in order to
preclude an unrealistic interpretation by the Commissioner for amortization
and depreciation deductions.
In instances where the nature of the expenditure is not specifically
governed and expressly contained in a lease, the question of classification
will arise, namely, is it one of a capital or revenue nature.") To avoid un-
anticipated interpretations, the intentions of lessor and lessee with regard
to classification of the expenditures should be expressly contained in the
lease.
Conjectural or estimated loss in value based on obsolescence, inade-
quacy, or deterioration are not deductible under any circumstance."1
In all instances, where the lease duration is difficult of ascertainment,
and the useful life of the improvement is the basis upon which the amor-
tization or depreciation deduction is calculated, the taxpayer will ultimately
have his deduction for any unamortized or undepreciated balances in the
year in which the premises are abandoned 52 or the lease is cancelled.
Depreciation, Amortization and Related Problems of Lessor
Depreciation, an allowable deduction to the landlord, as an ordinary
and necessary business expense, is more directly related to the allocation
of the cost of the asset over its useful life, rather than the use to which
the asset is put by the lessee or the period of time that its use is granted to
the lessee by the lessor.
To allow the deduction for depreciation, there must be a present loss.
For example, where a lease requires the lessee to repair the property and
return property of equal value, the lessor is not entitled to deduct depre-
48. Standard Tube Co., 6 T.C. 950 (1946).
49. See I.G. Zumwalt, 25 B.TA. 566 (1932).
50. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 138 (8th Cir.
1954); Terre Haute Housing Co., 17 B.T.A. 384 (1929); Shugerman, Basic Criteria
for Distinguishing Revenue Charges from Capital Expenditures in Income Tax Com-
putations, 49 Micii. L. REv. 213 (1950).
51. Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333 (1929); Harris-Emery Co., 10 B.T.A. 297
(1928).
52. I.T. 1676, CUM. BULL. 11-1, 122 (1923).
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ciation. 53  Likewise, deposits to a depreciation fund are not classified as
present losses.54
An interesting situation arises, however, where a landlord has his
building demolished to secure a tenant. The cost of the old building is
generally deductible over the lease term. In denying a loss in the year
the buildings are demolished, the court feels that there is a compensating
value (a lease) for the loss of the buildings. In such an instance, the trans-
action is in effect an exchange of the leasehold estate for the lessee's ob-
ligations, and must be amortized over the lease term. The loss is inter-
preted as one to secure a new lease, and may not be deducted as a loss
or expense in the year incurred. '
Generally, expenses incurred in procuring a lease are capitalized and
should be spread over the life of the lease regardless of what method of ac-
counting the taxpayer uses.56
A problem which is sometimes confronted by counsel and the cor-
porate taxpayer is the disposition of unamortized leasehold expenses upon
the dissolution of the lessor corporation. Generally, only such part of the
unamortized balance of these expenses applicable to the taxable year may
be deducted, thus disallowing the entire deduction in the year of dissolu-
tion .57 The court's reasoning is predicated upon the theory that the transfer
of the right to this annual amortization of the capital expenditure has
been made to the corporation's successor in interest, namely, the stock-
holders 8
Where, however, a lease is cancelled or expires and unamortized lease-
hold expenses exist, a new lease may prevent the deduction of these un-
amortized costs in the year in which the lease expires. Such costs are ex-
tended over the period of the new lease or the estimated life of the im-
provement, whichever is the shorter."
With regard to the right of the lessor's successors in interest to amor-
tize the adjusted basis of buildings demolished by the lessee, an interest-
ing illustration is the Rowlan" case, where buildings were demolished by
the lessee to make way for a new building. The lessor was allowed an an-
nual deduction on account of the demolition, deductible over the remain-
53. Commissioner v. Terre Haute Elec. Co., 67 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1933). See
Atlantic Coast Line RR. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1936) (where both
lessee and lessor were denied a deduction for depreciation on the theory that the lessee
sustained no loss and the lessor had no capital improvement),
54. Minneapolis Sec. Bldg. Corp., 38 B.T.A. 1220 (1938) (where the name "de-
preciation fund" was not controlling as to its real nature).
55. Young v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 692, aff'd 59 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1932).
56. Babbage, 27 B.T.A. 57 (1932); Lovejoy, 18 B.T.A. 1179 (1930); Walter &
Co., 4 B.T.A. 142 (1926).
57. Plaza Investment Co., 5 T.C. 1295 (1945); Cf. S & L Bldg. Corp., 19 B.T.A.
788 (19309).
58. Wolan v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1950).
59. Phil Cluckstern's Inc., T.C. Memo 1956-9; Pig & Whistle Co., 9 B.T.A. 668
(1927).
6k. Rowlan, 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
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ing life of the old lease. Upon the death of the lessor, an heir to a 1/3
interest in the property claimed 1/3 of the amortization as previously
deducted by the testator (lessor). The court, of course, disallowed this
novel interpretation, citing Section 113 (a) (5) of the Code.
Where a new lease is executed prior to the expiration of the old lease,
a problem is sometimes created as to the allocation of any unamortized
leasehold costs at the time of execution of the new lease. This problem was
presented in the Pig & Whistle Co."' case where the lessee claimed t1he
unamortized costs of the old lease became a loss on execution of the new
lease and that a deduction of the total amount should be allowed in the
year in which the new lease is executed. The court held that these costs
should be prorated over the term of the new lease, although there was a
"constructive" cancellation of the old lease. Had there not been a new
lease entered into, this cost undoubtedly would have been deductible, but
the court held that there was such a continuity of rights and such an in-
terrelation between the two leases that the unextinguished costs of the
first lease were part of the cost and consideration of the second lease. -
Bonus to Cancel Lease
A. By the landlord. Cancellation of leases occur generally for the fol-
lowing reasons: landlord no longer feels that the tenant is desirable; land-
lord wishes to sell the property and his prospective buyer does not desire
the present tenant; landlord wants to change the character of the tenancy;
landlord wants to demolish the present building and erect a new build-
ing; landlord has elected to exercise a condition of the lease wherein bonus
is to be paid in the event of cancellation.
Generally, where a bonus is paid for any of the aforementioned rea-
sons, the cost thereof is capitalized. Where a new lease is effected, usually
the cost of cancelling the prior lease is amortized over the remaining period
of the old lease. 3
Receipt of these bonus payments by the tenant usually results in cap-
ital gain as a sale of a leasehold interest.
61. 9 B.T.A. 668 (1927).
62. Suppose a taxpayer is considering a lease of business realty, and intends to
construct a new building costing $100,000 on the leased premises. If a 20-year lease
contained an option to renew for an additional 20 years at the same rental figure, and
the building had an estimated useful life of 50 years, under the present law the tax-
payer would be allowed an annual deduction of $5,000. Only the original lease term
need be taken into consideration.
The practitioner should be reminded that under the proposed tax changes listed
in the Mills Committee Release by the Joint Staff and Treasury Department, proposed
effective date for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1956, the taxpayer would
be required to add on the renewal term. Since the original lease plus the renewal ag-
gregate 40 years, the annual amortization deduction would be only $2,500 per year.
63. H. B. Borland, 27 B.T.A. 538 (1933); C. B. Bretzfelder, 21 B.T.A. 789 (1930);
Contra: Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1947) (where lessor had the right to amortize the cost of cancelling the old lease
over the term of a new lease).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Although not considered as a bonus payment, an interesting prob-
lem arises where the lessee subleases, thus creating a lessee-sublessor rela-
tionship with his lessor. Prior to 1956 payments received by a lessee-sub-
lessor were includible in the gross income of the lessee-sublessor as ordi-
nary income. 4 However, the Internal Revenue Service now holds that
amounts received in consideration of the surrender or release by the tenant
to the landlord of possessory rights in real estate under a lease or under a
statute entitling the tenant to continue in possession following expiration
of a lease, or amounts received by a tenant from the landlord in considera-
tion of the relinquishment of a lease covenant restricting the use of the
real estate by the landlord, constitute proceeds from the sale of a capital
asset within the meaning of Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939.0 The foregoing holding does not apply to a situation involving the
transfer, for a lump sum, of the right to collect ordinary income.
B. By the tenant. A tenant will often pay a bonus to the landlord to be
released from onerous conditions, or, to induce the landlord to change
or include certain advantageous conditions in an existing lease. Bonuses
received by the landlord under these circumstances are construed as ordi-
nary income and taxable when received. Where bonus payments are made
by the tenant and he continues in occupancy, said payments are generally
amortized over the remaining life of the lease, But where the tenancy is
terminated, such bonus payment is deductible as an ordinary expense in the
year of payment.
In Hort v. Commissioner,6 the petitioner (lessor) attempted to relate
the fair rental value of the premises to the present value of unmatured
rentals and by virtue thereof sustained a $21,494.75 loss, thus reducing the
taxable income which included a bonus payment of $140,000. The Board
of Tax Appeals, not agreeing with the petitioner's position, disallowed
the loss and held the bonus payment to be a substitution for rental pay-
ment and taxable as ordinary income. Apparently, from an accounting
standpoint, the landlord had set up these unmatured rentals as a receivable
and similarly set up the rental as deferred income. The petitioner, in his
pleadings, elected to discuss the receivable aspect of the problem but ig-
nored the impact on deferred income. The lessor was using a device which
sounded good, but he overlooked the fact that taxable income had not
been increased by these unmatured receivables.
In all cases it must be remembered that any loss must be a "real" loss,
not conjectural, and the landlord does not suffer a loss for accrued rentals
when the premises have been abandoned by the tenant, unless such rentals
had previously been recorded as taxable income.67
64. Rev. Rul. 129, CuM. BULL. 1953-2, 97.
65. Rev. Rul. 56-531, INT. REv. BULL. 1956-43 (Oct. 22, 1956).
66. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
67. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1935).
